UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

8-24-2020

State v. Foeller Appellant's Brief Dckt. 47777

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs

Recommended Citation
"State v. Foeller Appellant's Brief Dckt. 47777" (2020). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All. 8173.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/8173

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All by
an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

Electronically Filed
8/24/2020 1 :07 PM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.
MELISSA KAY FOELLER,
Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 47777-2020
KOOTENAI COUNTY
NO. CR28-18-20682

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

HONORABLE SCOTT WAYMAN
District Judge

ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN
State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #6555
KIMBERLY A. COSTER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #4115
322 E. Front Street, Suite 570
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone:(208)334-2712
Fax: (208) 334-2985
E-mail: documents@sapd.state.id.us
ATTORNEYS FOR
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534

ATTORNEY FOR
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..................................................................................................... iii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................................................................................................... 1
Nature of the Case ........................................................................................................... 1
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Course of Proceedings ..................................................................................................... 2
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL .......................................................................................... 5
ARGUMENT .............................................................................................................................. 6
I.

This Court Should Vacate The Restitution Order Because The District Court
Erred, As A Matter Of Law, When It Included An Award To The Idaho
State Tax Commission For Estimated Income Tax ........................................................... 6
A. Introduction ............................................................................................................... 6
B. Standard OfReview ................................................................................................... 6
C. The District Court Erred In Interpreting The Statute To Include
Estimated Income Tax As An "Economic Loss" Within The
Meaning Of The Statute, And Therefore Erred In Awarding
Restitution To The Tax Commission .......................................................................... 7
1. An Interpretation Of"Economic Loss" To Include Estimated Income
Tax Conflicts With The Provisions Of The Idaho Income Tax Act.. ..................... 8
2. The Type Of Loss Claimed By The Tax Commission Is Not
Compensable Under The Criminal Restitution Statute ........................................ 10

II. This Court Should Vacate The Restitution Order Because The District Court
Abused Its Discretion By Failing To Adequately Consider Ms. Foeller's
Ability To Ever Repay The Amount Of The Award That It Ordered .............................. 11
A. Introduction ............................................................................................................. 11
B. Standard OfReview ................................................................................................. 12
C. The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Ordering Restitution In An
Amount That It Recognized Ms. Foeller Would Not Be Able To
Repay In The Foreseeable Future ............................................................................. 12

CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................................... 16
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE .................................................................................................. 16

11

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Arambarri v. Armstrong, 152 Idaho 734 (2012) ........................................................................... 6
Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center v. Gooding County, 159 Idaho 84 (2015) ................... 7
State v. Anderson, 145 Idaho 99 (2008) ....................................................................................... 7
State v. Bybee, 115 Idaho 541 (Ct. App. 1989) .......................................................................... 13
State v. Cottrell, 152 Idaho 387 (Ct. App. 2012) .......................................................................... 9
State v. Garcia, 166 Idaho 661 (2020) ..................................................................... 12, 13, 14, 15
State v. Owens, 158 Idaho 1 (2015) ............................................................................................. 6
State v. Straub, 153 Idaho 882 (2013) .............................................................................. 6, 10, 11
State v. Wisdom, 161 Idaho 916 (2017) ..................................................................................... 13
Todd v. Sullivan Const. LLC, 146 Idaho 118 (2008) .................................................................. 11

Statutes
I.C. § 19-5304 .................................................................................................................... passim
I.C. § 28-22-104(2) ................................................................................................................... 15
I.C. § 54-2019(1)(1) .................................................................................................................. 15
I.C. § 63-3001 ........................................................................................................................... 10

I.C. § 63-3022 ............................................................................................................................. 9
I.C. § 63-3045 ....................................................................................................................... 8, 10
I.C. § 63-3075 ............................................................................................................................. 3

Additional Authorities
https://sto.idaho.gov/Reports/Legal-Rate-oflnterest .................................................................. 15

111

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This case presents an important question not previously addressed by Idaho's appellate
courts regarding the interpretation of Idaho's criminal restitution statute, LC. § 19-5304.
Specifically, this Court is asked to decide whether the Tax Commission may use the criminal
restitution statute to collect income tax. This question turns on whether the Idaho legislature
intended the "economic loss" that is compensable as restitution to include income taxes.
Melissa Kay Foeller pled guilty to grand theft for embezzling from her employer, and to
willfully evading her state income tax obligations related to the embezzled funds and the income
from her employment.

Over Ms. Foeller's objections, the district court entered a restitution

order against Ms. Foeller that included an award of $48,775 to the Idaho Tax Commission, based
upon the Tax Commission's estimate of the taxes owed on all of Ms. Foeller's unreported
income. The district court additionally awarded $540,952.87 to the victims of the embezzlement,
notwithstanding Ms. Foeller's objection that she will not ever be able to repay that amount of
restitution.
On appeal, Ms. Foeller challenges the district court's award of restitution to the State Tax
Commission, arguing that an estimated income tax liability is not an "economic loss" within the
meaning of Idaho's criminal restitution statute. She argues that because the legislature did not
include "income tax" among the items delineated as constituting "economic loss" within the
meaning of the restitution statute, and because in Idaho Income Tax Act, the legislature
provided the exclusive mechanism by which the Commission must assess and collect income tax,
including tax on unreported income, the district court erred by awarding restitution to the Idaho
Tax Commission.
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Additionally, Ms. Foeller asserts that the district court abused its discretion by entering
an order of restitution without properly considering her ability, in the foreseeable future, to repay
the amount awarded.
Ms. Foeller asks this Court to vacate the district court's order of restitution and remand
her case for a redetermination of the restitution award.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Ms. Foeller worked as a payroll accountant for Silverwood Theme Park ("Silverwood")
from 2008 until 2017, when her employment was terminated. (ConfDocs., pp.9-12, 24.) A
subsequent investigation revealed that Ms. Foeller and the company's then-chief financial
officer, Christopher Wyatt, had been embezzling from Silverwood for several years.
(ConfDocs., pp.9, 71.) As Ms. Foeller later explained, she used the money to feed her severe,
ten-year gambling addiction, or to pay bills that had resulted from that addiction. (ConfDocs.,
pp.10-11.)
In December 2017, the State filed an Indictment charging Ms. Foeller with five counts of
grand theft, for taking money from Silverwood in 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, and 2017.
(ConfDocs., p.1.)

The State claimed the combined amounts taken from Silverwood by

Ms. Foeller and Mr. Wyatt totaled nearly $1,000,000. (R., p.51.)
A newspaper article about the case caught the attention of an Idaho State Tax
Commission employee, Kristin Lewis, and she contacted the prosecutor. (Tr., p.133, Ls.5-13.)
According to Ms. Lewis's later testimony, the Tax Commission investigated the matter to
determine whether Ms. Foeller had reported the embezzled funds on her tax returns. (Tr., p.133,
Ls.5-13.) As a result of that investigation, the Commission found that Ms. Foeller filed her 2013
tax return but did not report the embezzled income, and for the subsequent reporting years, 2014
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through 2017, Ms. Foeller had filed no tax returns, and had thus reported none of her income for
that period. (Tr., p.134, L.5-p.138, L.11.)
The State subsequently filed an Amended Indictment 1 that combined the theft charges
into two counts, and added a new count: tax evasion. (R., p.63.) Pursuant to the terms of a plea
agreement with the State, Ms. Foeller pled guilty to those charges and agreed to pay restitution
"if applicable, per statute." (R., p.56; Tr., p.98, Ls.5-24.) Ms. Foeller was sentenced to an
aggregate term of fourteen years, with three years fixed, without probation or retained
jurisdiction. (R., p.91; Tr., p.114, L.21 - p.115, p.2.)
The State filed a request seeking $540,952.872 in restitution for the victims of the theft
charges; specifically, $535,952.87 to Travelers Casualty, the insurer who had covered
Silverwood's loss; and $10,000 to Silverwood, representing the insurance deductible amount.
(R., p.103). The State additionally sought restitution for the income tax evasion. (R., pp. I 0304.) The State requested an award to the Idaho Tax Commission of $48,775 - an amount
purportedly representing the estimated tax on all of Ms. Foeller's unreported income.
(R., pp.103-04; see Tr., p.132, L.12-p.1438, L.7.)
At the subsequent restitution hearing, the parties stipulated that Ms. Foeller's restitution
obligation to Silverwood was $5,000, representing a portion of Silverwood's insurance
deductible. (Tr., p.154, Ls.2-3.) However, Ms. Foeller objected to the State's request that she be
ordered to pay the full $540,927 incurred by Traveler's on the basis of her inability to ever repay
1

The Amended Indictment omitted the 2013 theft, and alleged: Count I, Grand Theft, for taking
money from Silverwood in 2014 and 2015; Count II, Grand Theft, for taking money from
Silverwood in 2016 and 2017; and Count III, Tax Evasion, pursuant to the Idaho Income Tax
Act, Section 63-3075(b ), Idaho Code, for willfully evading state income tax obligations for the
years 2014 through 2018. (R., pp.56, 63-64; Tr., p.93, L.1 - p.98, L.22.)
2
The State had previously filed a request seeking $987,431 to Silverwood and Travelers, to be
paid joint and several with her former co-worker, Christopher Wyatt, the defendant in the related
theft case, CR28-18-20683. (R., pp.51, 71.)
3

an amount of that magnitude.

(Tr., p.147, L.8 - p.61, L.17.) In support of her objection,

Ms. Foeller cited her fmancial indigence, lack of financial resources, her documented disability
for severe mental health disorders, and her significantly diminished future earning capacity. (Tr.,
p.149, L.8 - p.150, L.17.) She also noted that the interest that will accrue on such amount will
be "astronomical" by the time she is released from prison, and that it will continue to grow. (Tr.,
p.149, L.8 - p.150, L.17.)

Ms. Foeller argued that, based on the record, there was every

indication that she would never be able to pay any significant amount of such an award. (Tr.,
p.149, L.8 -p.150, L.17.)
Additionally, Ms. Foeller objected to the $48,775 requested on behalf of the Idaho State
Tax Commission. (See Tr., p.133, Ls.18-25.) She argued that the income tax claimed by the Tax
Commission did not did not meet the restitution statute's defmition of "economic loss."
(Tr., p.61, L.20 - p.62, L.16.) She also objected that the dollar amounts requested by the Idaho
Tax Commission were "estimates." (Tr., p.149, Ls.18-20.)
The district court overruled Ms. Foeller's objections and awarded all of the items
requested by the State, in the full amounts requested: $5,000 to Silverwood (as stipulated by the
parties); $535,952.87 to Travelers; and $48,775.00 to the State Tax Commission. (Tr., p.155,
Ls.6-12; R., pp.103, 105.) The district court additionally ordered that interest begin to accrue
from the date of its order. (R., p.105.)
Ms. Foeller filed a Notice of Appeal that is timely from the restitution order. (R., p.108.)

4

ISSUES
I.

Should this Court vacate the restitution order because the district court erred, as a matter
of law, when it included an award to the Idaho State Tax Commission for estimated
income tax?

II.

Should this Court vacate the restitution order because the district court abused its
discretion by failing to adequately consider Ms. Foeller's ability to ever repay the amount
of the award that it ordered?

5

ARGUMENT
I.

This Court Should Vacate The Restitution Order Because The District Court Erred, As A Matter
Of Law, When It Included An Award To The Idaho State Tax Commission For Estimated
Income Tax

A.

Introduction
Idaho's criminal restitution statute, LC.§ 19-5304, authorizes the district court to order

restitution to victims for "economic loss" actually suffered as the result of a defendant's crime.
Ms. Foeller argues that estimated income tax is not an "economic loss" within the meaning of the
statute, and that the district court erred as a matter of law when it interpreted the statute to
authorize an award of restitution to the State Tax Commission.
B.

Standard Of Review
The district court's interpretation and application of the restitution statute presents a

question oflaw over which the appellate court exercises free review. State v. Straub, 153 Idaho
882, 885 (2013). When interpreting a statute, the court's aim is "to derive the intent of the
legislative body that adopted the act." State v. Owens, 158 Idaho 1, 3 (2015) (quotation marks
and citations omitted). "Statutory interpretation begins with the statute's plain language," giving
words "their plain, usual, and ordinary meanings."

Id.

When the statute's language is

unambiguous, the legislature's clearly expressed intent must be given effect, and the court must
not go beyond the statute's plain language to consider other rules of statutory construction. Id.
However, "if the statute is ambiguous" or "arguably in conflict with other laws," a court
is required to engage in statutory construction. Arambarri v. Armstrong, 152 Idaho 734, 739
(2012). Whenever the court must engage in statutory construction, it has the duty to give effect
to legislative intent.

Id.

In so doing, the court examines the proffered interpretations and
6

considers the "context in which the language is used," the "public policy behind the statute," as
well as legislative history. Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center v. Gooding County, 159
Idaho 84, 87 (2015). Additionally, because Section 19-5304 is a criminal restitution statute, the
rule oflenity should apply to construe the statute in favor of Ms. Foeller. State v. Anderson, 145
Idaho 99, 103 (2008) ("The rule of lenity states that criminal statutes must be strictly construed
in favor of defendants.").
C.

The District Court Erred In Interpreting The Statute To Include Estimated Income Tax As
An "Economic Loss" Within The Meaning Of The Statute, And Therefore Erred In
Awarding Restitution To The Tax Commission
Ms. Foeller submits that estimated income tax does not meet the definition of "economic

loss" provided in the restitution statute. As defined in that section:
"Economic loss" includes, but is not limited to, the value of property taken,
destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, lost wages and direct out-of-pocket loss
or expenses, such as medical expenses resulting from the criminal conduct, but
does not include less tangible damage such as pain and suffering, wrongful death
or emotional distress.
I.C. § 19-5304(1)(a).
Estimated income tax plainly does not fit within the items delineated as economic loss,
i.e., estimated income tax owed is not "property taken, destroyed, broken or otherwise harmed,"

nor is it "lost wages" or an "out-of-pocket loss or expense." On the other hand, estimated taxes
is not expressly excluded by the statute's list of "less tangible damages." The question then is
whether the statute's "not limited to" language should be read to expand the statute to include
income taxes as an economic loss to the Idaho State Tax Commission.
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1.

An Interpretation Of "Economic Loss" To Include Estimated Income Taxes
Conflicts With The Provisions Of The Idaho Income Tax Act

The provisions of the Idaho Income Tax Act indicate that the legislature did not intend
that income taxes be included in the restitution statute as "economic loss." The provisions of the
Idaho Income Tax Act, which are set forth in chapter 30, Title 63 of Idaho Code, provide the

exclusive means for assessing and collecting Idaho income tax. As demonstrated herein, the
district court's interpretation of the criminal restitution statute are in conflict with those
prov1s1ons.
Section 63-3045(1)(a) requires the State Tax Commission to send a Notice of Deficiency
when it believes there is a deficiency in tax. LC. § 63-3045(l)(a). The Act also provides that the
Tax Commission must give the taxpayer 63 days to file a protest with the Commission after the
Commission mails the Notice of Deficiency to the taxpayer, and additionally affords the taxpayer
the right to an administrative hearing. LC. § 63-3045(1) and (2). Significantly, until the Tax
Commission has complied with the prescribed notice requirements and provided the taxpayer an
opportunity to appeal the deficiency, Idaho Code § 63-3045(1 )( c) explicitly precludes both the
assessment of tax and any judicial proceedings for the collection of tax:
(c) No assessment of a deficiency in respect to the tax imposed by this chapter, and no
distraint or proceedings in court for its collection, shall be made, begun, or prosecuted
until such notice has been mailed to the taxpayer, nor until all appeal rights relating to the
deficiency have become fmal.
LC.§ 63-3045(1)(c) (emphasis added).
Similarly, Section 63-3045A(l) expressly precludes judicial proceedings to collect tax,
until the provisions of the statute are complied with:
Assessment of tax. (1) Except as provided in subsection (2) of this section, no tax
commission activities to enforce collection of tax may be conducted, nor may a
proceeding to collect a tax be instituted, until taxes are assessed in accordance with the
provisions of this section.
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I.C. § 63-3045A(l)(emphasis added).
These statutes demonstrate that the legislature intended the statutory scheme set forth in
Idaho Income Tax Act to be the exclusive mechanism for assessing and collecting Idaho income
tax.

Therefore, this Court should not permit the Tax Commission to sidestep and avoid its

statutory obligations under these statutes by seeking to collect tax as a "victim" under the
restitution statute, instead of going through the legislatively-prescribed assessment and collection
procedures.
Moreover, a single restitution statute is a poor substitute for the entire tax code in
determining tax liability. For example, under the Idaho Income Tax Act, a taxpayer may have a
tax liability now, which may be eliminated later by events occurring in future years such as net
operating losses carried back to the present year. 3 See I.C. § 63-3022(c)(2).

Similarly, if a

taxpayer receives income in one year and later restores (e.g. pays it back) that income, the
taxpayer may in some circumstances receive a deduction in the later tax year under the "claim of
right doctrine." See I.C. § 63-3022F. In contrast to the Idaho Income Tax Act, the criminal
restitution statue has no mechanism for making adjustments to a tax liability for events occurring
after the restitution hearing. See generally I.C. §§ 19-5304.
Furthermore, the Tax Commission is unlike those crime victims who are ill-prepared to
pursue a civil action to recover a loss caused by criminal activity, and for whom the criminal
restitution statute is intended to assist. See State v. Cottrell, 152 Idaho 387, 398 (Ct. App. 2012)
(stating that "one of the purposes of the restitution is to obviate the need for victims to incur the
cost and inconvenience of a separate civil action in order to gain compensation" and that in this
sense, restitution is about "victim assistance.") In contrast to the less-capable crime victim, the
3

In the event of a net operating loss carry back, the taxpayer can file an amended return for the
earlier year. LC. § 63-3022( c)(2).
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Tax Commission is in the very business of collecting taxes and is well-equipped to do so with
specific statutory authority to collect taxes. See generally I.C. § 63-3001 et seq. In any event,
and as detailed above, the legislature has laid out specific procedures in the Idaho Income Tax
Act that the Tax Commission must follow to protect taxpayer rights and ensure accurate
determinations.

The Commission should not be permitted to avoid compliance with those

procedures by offering itself as a "victim" and seeking restitution for amounts it has only
"estimated."

2.

The Type Of Loss Claimed By The Tax Commission Is Not Compensable Under
The Criminal Restitution Statute

In State v. Straub, the Idaho Supreme Court observed that the criminal restitution statute
is not a substitute for every type of civil action to recover money from a criminal defendant. 153
Idaho 882, 890 (2013). There, the Court specifically addressed whether a claim for lost future
earnings was compensable under the criminal restitution statute. Id. 153 Idaho at 890. The
Court explained,
The restitution statute was never meant to be a substitute for a civil action where
the law is settled as to damages and the quantum of admissible proof needed to
prove those damages. If we allow all foreseeable damages to be clothed in
criminal restitution, we will draw to a standstill an already overburdened criminal
court process. Prosecutors and criminal defense attorneys would then have to
engage in civil discovery and trials of a civil nature on top of already complex
criminal procedure and trials.

Id.
Ms. Foeller submits that, applying the reasoning of Straub, because the law is settled as
to the procedures that must be followed for the "assessment" of tax that the Commission believes
to be owed and due, which is a prerequisite to collecting the tax, see e.g., I.C. §§ 63-3045(1), 633045A, and because there is no substantial evidence in the record showing those mandatory
procedures were followed or that an "assessment" of the tax was ever made in this case (see

generally Tr.; R.; Conf.Docs), this Court should not allow the assessment and collection of
income tax to be "clothed" as criminal restitution. Straub, 153 Idaho at 890. Instead, and as in
Straub, this Court should conclude that the claimed loss falls outside of the criminal restitution
statute. Id.
Additionally, and to be clear, the Commission was not a victim of the embezzlement. On
the contrary, the Commission seeks compensation as a beneficiary of that embezzlement. In this
regard, the Commission's attempt to collect the lost tax revenue is more akin to a civil claim to
recover lost profits. The Idaho Supreme Court has stated that, like civil lawsuit seeking
compensation for "future earnings," claims for "lost profits" must be proved with "reasonable
certainty." Todd v. Sullivan Const. LLC, 146 Idaho 118, 122 (2008) ("Compensatory damages
for lost profits and future earnings must be shown with a reasonable certainty.") To the extent
the Tax Commission's claim is one that seeks to recover for lost tax revenue, and resembles a
claim for "lost profits" or "future earnings," this Court should conclude that, under the reasoning
of Straub, estimated income tax is not an "economic loss" and is not recoverable under the
restitution statute.
For the above reasons, this Court should conclude that estimated income tax is not
"economic loss" within the meaning of the restitution statute and that the district court erred in
concluding otherwise. Therefore, the district court's decision to award restitution to the State
Tax Commission should be reversed.
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II.
This Court Should Vacate The Restitution Order Because The District Court Abused Its
Discretion By Failing To Adequately Consider Ms. Foeller's Ability To Ever Repay The
Amount Of The Award That It Ordered

A.

Introduction
Ms. Foeller does not dispute that Travelers incurred economic loss as the result of her

criminal conduct, nor does she challenge the calculation of the amount of the economic loss as
$535,952.87. (Tr., p.149, Ls.10-17.) Rather, she asserts the district court abused its discretion
by ordering such a substantial amount of restitution, noting also the accruing interest, without
properly considering her ability to ever repay that amount in the future. Under the Supreme
Court's holding and reasoning in State v. Garcia, 166 Idaho 661 (2020), the district court's
failure to find that Ms. Foeller could in the foreseeable future be able to pay the amount ordered,
demonstrates a failure of reason. The district court's restitution order should be vacated and
Ms. Foeller's case should be remanded.

B.

Standard Of Review
When reviewing a district court's order ofrestitution for abuse of discretion, the appellate

court examines whether the district court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion;
(2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal
standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the
exercise ofreason. State v. Garcia, 166 Idaho 661, _, 462 P.3d 1125, 1145 (2020).

C.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Ordering Restitution In An Amount That It
Recognized Ms. Foeller Would Not Be Able To Repay In The Foreseeable Future
"Whether to order restitution, and in what amount, is within the district court's discretion

and 1s guided by consideration of the factors set forth in Idaho Code section 19-5304(7)."
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Garcia, 462 P .3d at 1145 (citations and internal bracket omitted). Under that section of the
statute, the district court "shall consider the amount of economic loss sustained by the victim as
a result of the offense, the financial resources, needs and earning ability of the defendant, and
such other factors as the court deems appropriate."' LC. § 19-5304(7)). The statute provides that
the "immediate inability to pay restitution by a defendant shall not be, in and of itself, a reason to
not order restitution." Id.
Additionally, under this Court's precedent, "[a] court may order restitution based on
a foreseeable ability to repay the award." Garcia, 462 P.3d at 1145 (citations omitted). Whether
a defendant has a foreseeable ability to repay the award requires a factual finding, and such a
finding will not be disturbed on appeal so long as it is supported by substantial evidence in the
record. Id. 462 P.3d at 115-16.
In Garcia, the Idaho Supreme Court concluded the district court had abused its discretion
in entering an order of restitution requiring the defendant to pay $162,285.27, by failing to
properly consider the defendant's ability to repay that amount in the future. Id. 462 P.3d at 1145.
There, the Court observed that the district court had correctly acknowledged the proper factors to
consider in crafting an order of restitution, and had correctly identified that the "immediate
inability to pay" was not a reason to not order restitution. Id.

However, the Court observed a

defendant's "immediate inability" to pay was a separate concept from "foreseeable ability" to
repay the award." Id. (Emphasis added.) The Court went on the explain that,
the district court abused its discretion by not showing an exercise of reason. The
district court's analysis with respect to Garcia's ability to pay consists of one
sentence: "Having considered Garcia's economic circumstances, the Court
concludes that an order ofrestitution is appropriate in this case." The Court of
Appeals affirmed the district court in Bybee, noting that the district court had
acknowledged both the magnitude of the restitution and Bybee's business
acumen. See State v. Bybee, 115 Idaho 541, 543 (Ct. App. 1989). This Court
observed that the district court in Wisdom had specifically found that Wisdom
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could expect her employment situation to improve; this Court found that "[t]he
presentence materials serve[ d] as substantial evidence supporting that
conclusion." State v. Wisdom, 161 Idaho 916, 919 (2017). There is no similar
analysis provided by the district court here, even though nothing in the
presentence materials serves as "substantial evidence" that Garcia has any
foreseeable ability to repay the amount of restitution awarded.
Garcia, 462 P.3d at 1146-47.
The Court concluded that, unlike in Bybee and Wisdom, "the district court did not
address Garcia's future ability to repay at all" and that the failure to address the defendant's
future ability to repay the award was a "failure to show an exercise of reason, and therefore
constitutes an abuse of discretion." Id. 462 P.3d at 1146.
As in Garcia, the district court in Ms. Foeller's case court failed to make any finding
"that a defendant has the foreseeable ability to repay the award," and the district court entered
the award anyway. See Garcia, 462 P.3d at 1146. In addressing Ms. Foeller's claim of inability
to pay, the district court stated:
because the defendant is not going to be incarcerated forever, the defendant does
have the ability to earn money and does have the ability to pay some of this back
at some point. I do not find that an order of restitution would be inappropriate or
undesirable. In fact, given the nature of this crime and the amounts taken, the
Court finds that it is absolutely appropriate and desirable that the victims in this
case be fully compensated.
(Tr., p.154, L.20-p.67, L.5 (emphasis added).)
These findings fall critically short of a determination that Ms. Foeller has "the
foreseeable ability to repay the award." See Garcia, 462 P.3d at 1146 (emphasis added). The
district court acknowledged only Ms. Foeller ill have the ability "to pay some of this back" in the
foreseeable future, but the court did not address the magnitude of the award amount and
Ms. Foeller's ability to repay that award.

Rather, the district court's finding implicitly

14

recogmzes that Ms. Foeller will never be able to repay the amount that the district court
awarded. 4
Moreover, there is no substantial evidence in the record to support a finding that
Ms. Foeller will be able to repay the amount of restitution ordered in the foreseeable future. The
evidence before the district court established that Ms. Foeller was currently indigent and
disabled. (ConfDoc., pp.9, 61.) She was

unemployed, and had qualified for

Social Security benefits due to her significant mental health disability. 5 (ConfDoc., pp.9, 18-20,
61.) Upon her release from prison, Ms. Foeller will likely be a single woman and barely able to
provide for her own needs. (Tr., p.148, Ls.4-14; ConfDocs., p.23.) Though Ms. Foeller had a
once-valuable experience and education in accountancy (ConfDocs., pp.18-19), her mental
disability and felony conviction for embezzlement significantly reduce her future earning
capacity. See, e.g., LC. § 54-2019(1)(1) (imposing restrictions on the practice of accountancy).
Moreover, Ms. Foeller's sentence requires that she spend three years in prison, and she therefore
will owe an additional ninety thousand dollars in accrued interest6 to pay on the amount awarded,
even before she is released on parole. (R., pp.105; LC.§ 28-22-104(2)).
Just like in Garcia, the district court in this case made no finding, nor engaged in any
analysis, showing that Ms. Foeller had any foreseeable ability to repay the amount of the

4

Even the prosecutor did not attempt to argue that Ms. Foeller would ever be able to pay the
amount of the award, only that she would have the ability to find employment at some point "and
start reimbursing" for "all the restitution she owes," and so "it's appropriate to order restitution
in full." (Tr., p.146, Ls.13-18.)
5
Ms. Foeller has diagnoses including bipolar disorder, borderline personality disorder,
depression and schizoaffective disorder, with a history of commitments to psychiatric
institutions. (Conf.Docs., pp.20, 26, 40-42.)
6
By the time Ms. Foeller is eligible for parole, the interest that will have accrued on the amount
ordered by the district court will exceed $90,000, and will continue at the annual rate of 7.125.
See LC. § 28-22-104(2)); https://sto.idaho.gov/Reports/Legal-Rate-of-Interest (last visited
August 25, 2020).
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restitution awarded, and there is no substantial evidence in the record that would support such
finding. Just as in Garcia, "[t]his is a failure to exercise reason, and therefore constitutes an
abuse of discretion." 462 P.3d at 1147. Therefore, under the holding and reasoning of Garcia,
this Court should vacate the restitution award with respect to the amount of restitution to which
Ms. Foeller did not agree, and remand this case for a proper, reasoned consideration of all of the
factors identified in Section 19-5304(7), including Ms. Foeller's future ability to repay.

CONCLUSION
Ms. Foeller respectfully asks this Court to vacate the restitution order, except for the
$5,000 award to Silverwood to which she had agreed, and remand her case for the district court
to (1) exclude any award of restitution to the State Tax Commission; and (2) consider
Ms. Foeller's foreseeable ability to pay at some point in the future, when it considers the
amount of restitution to order.
DATED this 24 th day of August, 2020.
/ s/ Kimberly A. Coster
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Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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